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Abstract
This paper describes our experience using coordinated
atomic (CA) actions as a system structuring tool to
design and validate a sophisticated control system for a
complex industrial application that has high reliability
and safety requirements. Our study is based on the “Fault-
Tolerant Production Cell”, which represents a
manufacturing process involving redundant mechanical
devices (provided in order to enable continued production
in the presence of machine faults). The challenge posed by
the model specification is to design a control system that
maintains specified safety and liveness properties even in
the presence of a large number and variety of device and
sensor failures. We discuss in this paper: i) a design for a
control program that uses CA actions to deal with both
safety-related and fault tolerance concerns, and ii) the
formal verification of this design based on the use of
model-checking. We found that CA action structuring
facilitated both the design and verification tasks by
enabling the various safety problems (e.g. clashes of
moving machinery) to be treated independently. The
formal verification activity was performed in parallel with
the design activity: the interaction between them resulted
in a combined exercise in “design for validation”.
Key Words  — Concurrency, coordinated atomic (CA)
actions, exception handling, object orientation, formal
verification, model checking, reactive systems, reliability
and safety.
1: Introduction
The goal of this work is to investigate a rigorous
approach to the development of safety-critical
applications, in particular to examine the feasibility of
using coordinated atomic (CA) actions [11] as a
structuring tool to design a realistically-detailed fault-
tolerant control system, and then to use model-checking
to debug, improve, and verify the design formally.
A production cell model, based on a metal-processing
plant in Karlsruhe, Germany, was first created by the FZI
(Forschungszentrum Informatik) in 1993 [4] in order to
evaluate different formal methods and to explore their
practicability for industrial applications.  Since then, this
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original case study, Production Cell I, has attracted wide
attention and has been investigated by over 35 different
research groups. In 1996, the FZI presented the
specification of an extended model, called the “Fault-
Tolerant Production Cell” or Production Cell II [6]. This
second model exposes more and richer issues related to
failures and fault tolerance. Because devices, sensors and
actuators can fail, the required control program is
necessarily much more complex than the program for the
original, non-fault-tolerant production cell.
This paper is organized as follows. Following a brief
description of the CA action concept and the Fault-
Tolerant Production Cell, Section 3 presents an analysis
of possible failures. Section 4 describes a design of a
control system. Sections 5 and 6 describe the formal
validation of this design. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2: CA Actions and Production Cell II
Real-world applications often give rise to complex
concurrent and interacting activities. An effective
mechanism is required for controlling and coordinating
such activities. Due to their complexity, concurrent and
distributed systems are also very prone to faults and
errors. The CA action scheme [11] is motivated by the
need to deal with general and complicated fault situations
that occur in many real-world applications.
A CA action is a mechanism for coordinating multi-
threaded interactions and ensuring consistent access to
objects in the presence of concurrency and potential faults.
CA actions can be regarded as providing a programming
discipline for nested multi-threaded transactions [2] that in
addition provides very general exception handling
provisions. They augment any fault tolerance that is
provided by the underlying transaction system by
providing means for dealing with i) unmasked hardware
and software faults that have been reported to the
application level to deal with, and/or ii) application-level
failure situations that have to be responded to.
The concurrent execution threads participating in a
given CA action enter and leave the action synchronously.
Within the CA action, operations on objects can be
performed cooperatively by roles executing in parallel. To
cooperate in a CA action a group of concurrent threads
must come together and agree to perform each role of the
action, with each thread undertaking a different role. Inside
a CA action, some or of all its roles can be involved in
further (nested) CA actions. If an error is detected within a
CA action, appropriate recovery measures must be
invoked cooperatively, by all the roles, in order to reach
some mutually consistent conclusion.
Figure 1 shows an example in which two concurrent
threads enter a CA action in order to play the
corresponding roles. Within the CA action the two
concurrent roles communicate with each other and
manipulate the external objects cooperatively in pursuit of
some common goal. However, during the execution of the
CA action, an exception e is raised by one of the roles.
The other role is then informed of the exception and both
roles transfer control to their respective exception handlers
H1 and H2 for this particular exception, which then
attempt to perform forward error recovery. The effects of
erroneous operations on external objects are repaired, if
possible, by putting the objects into new correct states so
that the CA action is able to exit with an acceptable
outcome. The two threads leave the CA action
synchronously at the end of the action.
Thread  1
Thread 2
Time
CA action
e
raised exception e
exception handler H1
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow
cooperation 
between roles
return to normal
exit with success
accesses repairs
exception handler H2
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow return to normal
External Objects
start transaction commit transaction
role 1
role 2
Figure 1 Example of a CA Action.
In general, the desired effect of performing a CA
action is specified by an acceptance test. The effect only
becomes visible if the test is passed. The test allows both
a normal outcome and one or more exceptional (or
degraded) outcomes, with each exceptional outcome
signalling a specified exception to the surrounding
environment. The CA action is considered to have failed if
the action failed to pass the test, or roles of the action
failed to agree about the outcome. In this case, it is
necessary to try to undo potential effects of the CA action
and signal an abort exception to the environment. If the
CA action is unable to satisfy the “all-or-nothing”
property (e.g. because the undo fails), then a failure
exception must be signalled to the surrounding
environment. Ideally, the execution of a CA action will
only produce one of the following outputs: a normal
outcome, an exceptional outcome, an abort exception, or
a failure exception.
Production Cell II consists of six devices: two
conveyor belts (a feed belt and a deposit belt), an elevating
rotary table, two presses and a rotary robot that has two
orthogonal extendible arms equipped with electromagnets
(see Figure 2). These devices are associated with a set of
sensors that provide useful information to a “controller”,
and a set of actuators via which the controller can exercise
control over the whole system. The task of the cell is to
get a metal blank from its “environment” via the feed
belt, transform it into a forged plate by using a press, and
then return it to the environment via the deposit belt.
More precisely, the production cycle for each blank is: i)
if the traffic light for insertion shows green, a blank may
be added, e.g. by the blank supplier, to the feed belt, ii)
the feed belt conveys the blank to the table, iii) the table
rotates and rises to the position where the magnets of the
robot are able to grip the blank, iv) arm 1 of the robot
picks the blank up and places it into an unoccupied press,
v) the chosen press forges the blank, vi) arm 2 of the
robot removes the forged plate from the press and places it
on the deposit belt, and vii) if the traffic light is green,
the plate may be carried to the environment.
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Figure 2 Fault-Tolerant Production Cell (Top View).
Basic System Requirements
A correct controller or control program must satisfy
certain requirements specified by the Fault-Tolerant
Production Cell model, namely:
Safety: i) device mobility must be restricted, ii) device
collisions must be prevented, iii) blanks must not be
dropped outside safe areas (i.e. feed belt, table, press, and
deposit belt,) and iv) sufficient distance must be
maintained between blanks.
Liveness: Any blank put into the cell via the feed belt
must eventually leave the cell via the deposit belt and
must have been forged by one of the presses; this property
must still hold if one of the two presses fails.
Failure Detection and Continuous Service: When any of a
large number of defined failures occurs, it must be detected
and unless it just concerns one of the presses the system
must be stopped in a safe state. After recovery from the
failure, which typically would require action by the user
of the cell, the system should be able to resume
operations starting from this safe state. Similarly, after a
failed press has been repaired, it should be able to resume
its contributions to the production process. (Certain safety
requirements can no longer be met if some special failures
occur, e.g. a blank is dropped outside safe areas, but other
safety properties must still be guaranteed.)
Clock, Stop Watches and Alarm Signals
The Fault-Tolerant Production Cell model provides a
global system clock that gives the current time at any
instant. Based on this system clock, a control program
can implement several stop watches supervising
individual processes, e.g. the movement of the feed belt.
The model also provides an alarm signal mechanism for
reporting component failures to the user of the cell. The
control program is required to switch on the alarm
whenever a failure is detected — it is switched off by the
user when the failed device has been repaired.
3: Failure Definitions and Analysis
The major assumptions made in the Fault-Tolerant
Production Cell model, as defined by FZI, are:
1) The system clock, two traffic lights, and the alarm
signal mechanism are fault-free and do not fail.
2) Values of sensors, actuators and clocks are always
transmitted correctly without any loss or error.
3) No failure can cause devices to exceed certain
limiting positions; in the worst case devices are
stopped automatically.
4) All sensor failures are indicated by sensor values.
5) All actuator failures will cause devices to stop.
For a given device, we classify possible failures into:
i) sensor failures, ii) actuator failures, and iii) lost or
stuck blanks. We also show how a failure can be detected
by sensors, actuators, stopwatches, singly or in
combination. In many cases certain different types of
failure cannot be distinguished using just the on-line
information available. We therefore discuss failure
detection only, and assume that fault diagnosis and
subsequent device repair are performed off-line. Due to
limitations of space, we illustrate the analysis that we
performed by treating just the case of a single failure of a
press; for a complete treatment, see [12].
Sensor Failures: There are four sensors associated with
each press, one reporting whether a blank is in the press
(called blank sensor), and others reporting press positions.
A failure of the blank sensor can be detected by checking
whether a robot arm has transferred a blank to or from the
press. The failure of a sensor that reports press positions
can be detected by using a stop watch to measure the
moving time of the press and by checking other sensor
values on press positions.
Actuator Failures: Failure modes for the actuators that
move the lower part of a press include: no response (i.e.
cannot move), and a moving press unexpected stopping,
which can be detected by checking values of the press
position sensors and values of stop watches.
Stuck or Lost Blank: This failure can be detected only by
checking the value of the sensor that reports whether a
blank is in a press.
In order to detect various failures of sensors and
actuators as well as lost blanks, appropriate detection
measures must be incorporated into the control software.
Assertion statements are a common form of failure
detection measure. For example, after the control program
has sent a control command to the robot and asked the
robot to drop a blank into press 1, the value of the sensor
that reports a blank in the press must be checked by an
assertion. If the sensor returns 0, indicating that no blank
is in press 1, then an appropriate exception must be
raised.
There are several possibilities that could have caused
this exception: i) the blank might have been lost, ii) arm
1 of the robot might have failed to drop the blank, and iii)
the sensor of press 1 might have failed to report that the
blank has been dropped into the press. Unfortunately, our
analysis showed that distinguishing these failures from
each other at run-time is extremely difficult. In most
cases, if a failure occurs and thus an exception is raised,
the cell will simply have to be stopped in a safe state, if
at all possible, for the user to deal with.
Failures of sensors that report press positions and
failures of the press actuator can be detected by assertion
statements and identified unambiguously with the aid of
stopwatches. Such failures must be reported to the user
through the alarm. However, because the Fault-Tolerant
Production Cell has two presses, normal operations can
be maintained using a single press, albeit with some
performance degradation.
A device or sensor failure should not affect normal
operations of other devices. For example, when a failure
of the robot occurs and is handled by the control program,
the deposit belt should still deliver an already forged
blank, if there is one, to the blank consumer. In the
following, we will demonstrate how CA actions can
confine damage and failures effectively, and minimize the
impact of component failures on the entire cell.
4: Design of a Control Program
The main characteristics of our design are the way it
separates safety, functionality, and efficiency concerns
among a set of CA actions, which thus can be designed,
and validated, independently of each other, and of the set
of device/sensor-controllers that dynamically determine
the order in which the CA actions are executed at run-
time. In particular, the safety requirements are satisfied at
the level of CA actions, while the other requirements are
met by the device/sensor-controllers. There is a detailed
discussion in [13] as to how these design decision were
made and why we used actions to enclose the interaction
between certain devices in our control program developed
for Production Cell I. Our design for Production Cell II
follows a similar strategy. It includes 12 main CA
actions; each action controls one step of the blank
processing and typically involves passing a blank between
two devices. Any device can move only within a CA
action.
There are six concurrent execution threads in the
control program, corresponding to the six devices, each of
which threads basically performs a simple endless loop.
All device movements are performed within CA actions,
and the devices involved in each action are switched off
before the action is left, so that when not under the
control of an action each device is stationary. Two
additional threads model activities in the environment:
BlankSupplier, and BlankConsumer. Note that FeedBelt is
responsible for controlling the traffic light that indicates
when another blank can be inserted, while BlankConsumer is
responsible for controlling the light for deposit. A blank
is designed as an external object with respect to the top-
level CA actions. Usually, one role of a CA action takes
the blank as an input argument, and the device
corresponding to this role passes it to another role which
returns it as an output argument. Figure 3 portrays the 12
related CA actions as overlays on the FZI simulator
diagram [6].
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Figure 3 CA Actions That Control Production Cell II.
An intersection between CA actions in Figure 3, e.g.
between TransportBlank and LoadDepositBelt,
represents the fact that those CA actions cannot be
executed in parallel. The mutual exclusion feature of CA
actions guarantees that a blank or a device cannot be
involved in more than one action at a time so that neither
blanks nor devices can collide. Even if the actions that
devices participate in are invoked in the wrong order, the
result will be at worst a safe deadlock. Each device-
controller (i.e. an execution thread) is responsible for
dynamically specifying the sequence of actions that the
device will participate in. For example, the robot thread
can skip all the CA actions related to one of the presses if
this press has failed.
4.1: Design of CA Actions
Our design assumes that an action will begin only if
its pre-conditions are valid, and that if no exception is
raised during the execution of an action then its post-
conditions will hold (though this could, if so wished, be
checked using an acceptance test). For a given action,
these conditions are used to ensure that the execution of
that action will not violate in any way the system
requirements given in Section 3, especially those related
to safety and fault tolerance. Due to limitations of space,
we take just the action LoadPress1 as an example.
CA action LoadPress1
pre-conditions post-conditions
robot off Robot off
Blank on arm 1 No blank on arm 1
Both arms retracted Both arms retracted
Robot at one of the defined angles Robot angle: arm 1 towards press
1
press 1 off Press 1 off
no blank in press 1 Blank in press 1
press 1 in bottom position press 1 in middle position
Values of the related sensors or states of the related
actuators that can be used to check these conditions are
identified in our detailed design to facilitate the actual
implementation of a control program (see [12]).
Figure 4 illustrates the interactions (themselves
involving nested CA actions) between the participating
threads within the LoadPress1 action. This action has
four roles: Robot, Press1, RobotSensor, and
Press1Sensor, and represents the co-operation that
arranges for arm 1 of the robot to drop a blank into press
1.
concurrent threads CA action LoadPress1
RobotSensor
Robot(Arm1)
Press1Sensor
Press1
External
object
Blank
move press 1
to the middle
position
extend arm 1 retractarm 1
access
rotate robot
synchronizing drop blank
Figure 4 CA Action LoadPress1.
Action LoadPress1 is described below using the
COALA notation, which was developed for the formal
specification of CA actions [10]. Our Java
implementation of the control program is based on a set
of pre-defined templates for CA actions that can be used to
implement CA action designs specified in COALA.
CAA LoadPress1;
Interface
  Use
    MetalBlank;
  Roles
    Robot: blankType, robotActuator;
    Press1: blankType, press1Actuator;
    RobotSensor: arm1ExtensionSensor, …;
    Press1Sensor: blankSensor, …;
  Exceptions
    Press1Failure, Arm1Failure1, …;
                          ;;exceptions to
signal
Body
  Use CAA
                   ;;specify nested actions
    RotateRobot, MovePress1toMiddle, …;
  Object
    robotPress1Channel: Channel;  
                   ;;shared local objects
  Exceptions
    press1_failure, blank_sensor_failure, …;
                   ;;internal exceptions
  Handlers
    press1_handler, blank_sensor_handler, …;
  Resolution
    press1_failure -> press1_handler, …;
                   ;;exception resolution
graph
  Role Robot(…);
  Role Press1(…);
   … … … …
End LoadPress1;
The exceptions declared in the Interface part of an
action are those that can be signalled to the enclosing
action. The roles of an action can signal an exception
directly but must guarantee that the exception that is
signalled has been agreed by all the roles of that action. In
the case of abortion or failure, the CA action support
mechanism will enforce the abortion and signal the
appropriate exception, either abort or failure, to the
enclosing action. When multiple exceptions are raised
within an action, the CA action support mechanism
controls the execution of a resolution algorithm based on
an exception resolution graph declared in the Resolution
part. After a resolving exception is identified, the
corresponding handler declared in the Handlers part will
be invoked (see Section 4.3).
An exception handler will attempt to bring the
system back to normal. If it is successful, the CA action
will end with a normal outcome. However, in most
situations the handler can only provide some degraded
service, i.e. an exceptional outcome, and must signal the
corresponding exception. Again, in the case of abortion or
failure, the CA action support mechanism will take
control. If a further exception is raised during the
execution of an exception handler, control is transferred to
the CA action support mechanism immediately and the
action must either abort or signal a failure exception.
4.2: Dealing with Component Failures
We first investigate situations involving single
faults, i.e. we assume that only one component failure
can occur before the system is brought if necessary to a
safe stop, and the component is repaired. During the
execution of a CA action, if a failure (of a component
involved in this CA action) occurs and is detected by an
assertion statement or an acceptance test, a corresponding
exception will be raised within the action by one of its
roles. The exception is propagated immediately to the
other roles of the action and all roles then transfer control
to their exception handlers for this exception so that they
can attempt to perform appropriate error recovery. In most
cases when a component failure takes place in the cell, it
is not possible to recover completely from the error and
the normal post-conditions of the action can no longer be
satisfied. Thus, exceptional post-conditions with respect
to various given failures must be defined to specify the
exceptional outcomes of an action.
By way of example, we outline the basic
requirements for the handlers of two different exceptions:
Handler for the Press 1 Failure: The LoadPress1
action performs forward error recovery by moving the
robot to an appropriate position so that it will be able
to put the unforged blank, which is still on arm 1,
into press 2 once the press is available.
Handler for the Rotary Sensor or Motor Failure: (In
this case, action LoadPress1 fails to rotate the robot
to the intended position.) The action will simply use
backward error recovery to attempt to move the robot
back to its initial position and rotate it again. If the
failure persists, the action will produce an exceptional
outcome as defined below.
For the LoadPress1 action, we identify seven
exceptional outcomes and corresponding exceptional post-
conditions (see [12]). By way of example, the following
table illustrates the exceptional outcome when press 1
fails. Different exceptional outcomes may lead to different
states of the production cell. For example, the exceptional
outcome caused by just a press 1 failure corresponds to
the situation where the production cell continues with
only one operational press. On the other hand, since the
blank sensor is a redundant component of the cell, if both
presses are still operational its failure merely requires a
report to be made to the user of the cell. However, the
other five outcomes will have to stop the entire cell in a
safe state.
exception to signal Exceptional post-conditions
robot off
Blank on arm 1
press 1 failure Both arms retracted
Robot angle: arm 1 towards press 2
press 1 off
no blank in press 1
By means of such analyses, given the way in which
CA actions enable the different failure situations to be
treated independently of each other, the design of the
actual set of handlers for the various exceptional outcomes
of each of the 12 top-level CA actions becomes rather
straightforward – full details can be found in [12].
4.3: Dealing with Concurrent Failures
In the interests of simplicity, we assume that only
two failures may occur within the same time interval
before the system is stopped and the related components
repaired. Some concurrent failures can be covered
implicitly by the corresponding single failure situation.
Others may need different handling and require separate
post conditions. The following table shows post-
conditions for an example pair of concurrent failures:
exception to signal Exceptional post-conditions
robot off
(rotary sensor or Blank on arm 1
motor failure) & Both arms retracted
press 1 failure press 1 off
No blank in press 1
The failure of the robot’s rotary sensor or motor can
be detected automatically and indicated by a special sensor
value. However, the returned sensor value does not
indicate which component, i.e. the sensor or the motor,
actually failed. This causes difficulty in performing
effective error recovery. In such circumstances the control
program is designed simply to bring the system to a stop
in a safe state, so that off-line diagnosis can be performed.
For each (enclosing or nested) action, various
exceptions are defined based on failure analysis and an
exception graph for resolving concurrent exceptions is
defined. For example, the LoadPress1 action may give
rise to exceptions such as pr1_failure (press 1 failure),
b_sensor_failure (blank sensor failure),
arm1_failure1 (blank lost), arm1_failure2 (cannot
drop the blank), etc.
rs_m_failure & 
pr1_failure 
other undefined 
exceptions
universal exception
pr1_ 
failure
b_sensor
_failure
arm1_ 
failure1
rs_m_ 
failure
cs_ 
failure
rt_ 
except
arm1_ 
failure2
as_m_ 
failure1
as_m_ 
failure2
as_m_failure & 
b_sensor_failure 
cs_failure & 
rt_except 
Figure 5 Exception Graph for CA Action LoadPress1.
An exception graph for this action is shown in
Figure 5. For example, if both press 1 and the robot
rotation motor fail simultaneously, this exception graph
will be searched and the resolving exception
rs_m_failure & pr1_failure will be raised instead of
the individual exceptions rs_m_failure and pr1_
failure, so that a suitable handler for this particular
situation can be invoked. Any undefined exception pairs
will not be resolved and will simply lead to the raising of
the universal exception. (The handler for the universal
exception is responsible for stopping the system and
leaving the cell in a pre-defined safe state, if possible.)
4.4: Design of Device-Controllers
Device/sensor-controllers are used to determine
dynamically the order in which the CA actions are
executed. Eight controllers are designed: FeedBelt,
Table, Robot, Press1, Press2, DepositBelt,
Supplier, and Consumer. Two queue objects are defined
in order to improve the flexibility of operations of both
the robot and the deposit belt: robotQueue and
depositBeltQueue. The Press1 controller is shown
below as a simple example:
Press1Controller:
  loop forever {
robotQueue.put(PRESS1_FREE)
-- put message in robotQueue
LoadPress1.Press(plate)
-- activate action LoadPress1
ForgeBlank1.Press(plate)
-- activate action ForgeBlank1
robotQueue.put(FORGED_PLATE_IN_PRESS1)
-- put message in robotQueue
UnloadPress1.Press(plate)
-- activate action UnloadPress1 }
5: Validating Properties of the Cell
We had earlier developed a general scheme for
formalizing CA action-based designs of finite systems as
state transition systems specifically for the purpose of
checking system properties such as liveness, safety and
fault tolerance [1]. This general approach assumes that a
set of controlling processes is defined together with a set
of CA actions that are utilized by the controllers, and
enables the system behaviour to be formalized in terms of
its operations on the global objects in the system that are
external to all CA actions.
The state transition system corresponding to a CA
action-based design is characterized by its (global) state-
space, a set of initial states and a next-state relation.
The global state-space is composed from the global
objects and the state-spaces of the CA actions,
representing the kind of outcome – normal or exceptional
– produced by each CA action and encoding whether its
roles are idle or activated. The initial states are supposed
to satisfy two kinds of properties: i) any application
specific requirements that need to be considered, and ii) the
requirement that initially all roles should be idle and no
exception should have been signalled.
The next-state relation defines the computation
paths that are possible in the system. This corresponds
essentially to four kinds of activities that may occur in
the system: i) a controlling process may call and thus
invoke a role from a CA action, thereby activating it, ii)
if all roles of a CA action have been activated, the CA
action may be executed according to its interface
specification given in terms of pre- and post-conditions
for both normal and exceptional outcomes, iii) after a CA
action has been executed, a return is issued from its roles
to the corresponding controlling processes that called
them, and iv) a controlling process may execute an
(internal) action in which no CA action is involved.
Due to the atomicity of CA actions and since internal
actions of controlling processes are independent from each
other, it is sufficient to view only interleaving
occurrences of state transitions. Thus we have modelled
the next-state relation to encode the interleaving
semantics. We have used SMV [8] to represent the state
transition system so obtained. (The technical details of
representing a CA action-based design in SMV and the
properties of a system in CTL were described in [1].)
Model-checking is a technique for analyzing whether
a given set of behavioural properties is satisfied by a
given model. It is similar to exhaustive testing of a finite
instance, and it produces a counterexample whenever a
property is violated. We have model-checked a significant
proportion of the safety, liveness, and fault-tolerance
requirements for the Production Cell II case study. The
properties are expressed in terms of CTL formulae over
the transition system for the CA action-based design
formalized in SMV. CTL allows several temporal
modalities to be used for expressing properties over the
behaviour of a system; we have mainly used the AG
(“henceforth”) operator for expressing properties that are
to hold in all reachable states and the AF (“eventually”)
operator for expressing properties that are expected to
eventually hold in some reachable state.
We are mainly concerned with fault-tolerance
requirements which express properties over the behaviour
of a system despite the occurrence of a failure. These may
include safety and liveness properties. If tolerable is a
formula describing states where there are no faults, or
only those faults that are supposed to be tolerated by the
system, and if P expresses some desired property, then
formula 
AG (tolerable -> P)
expresses that along each execution path property P
is valid if and faults that occur are tolerable ones, i.e. P is
treated as a (conditional) safety property. Similarly for
liveness: the formula
  AF (tolerable -> P)
expresses that along each execution path either a state
satisfying P will be reached or a non-tolerable fault will
occur. This means that P will eventually become true
along each path where at most tolerable faults occur, i.e.
P is treated as a (conditional) liveness property.
If we set tolerable equal to true then we express
that any (modelled) failure should be tolerable. In this case
the conditional safety and liveness properties reduce to the
non-conditional forms AG P and AF P. Properties that are
only expected to hold in the case that no fault occurs now
need to be written in the conditional form where formula
tolerable characterises the fault-free cases.
We illustrate this scheme for formalizing properties
with the main fault-tolerance requirement, i.e. the
“continuous service requirement” which states that the
system will continue to operate in a degraded manner,
even if one of the presses fails. Such failures are signalled
by the CA action LoadPress1 as press1_failure or
b_sensor_failure. The property encoding the
continuous service requirement expresses that if a
press1_failure or a b_sensor_failure occurs, then
any blank in other devices of the Production Cell or
blanks inserted afterwards will be processed and arrive on
the deposit belt unless another failure occurs later. This is
formalized here for a blank with name id1 on the feed
belt:
“If a press1 related failure occurs ...”
AG (loadpress1.signal in
    { press1_failure, b_sensor_failure } ->
“... then a blank (named id1) on the feed belt ...”
AG (blank_on_feed_belt.id = id1 ->
“... will eventually, if only tolerable failures occur,
...”
AF ((loadpress1.signal in { normal,
         press1_failure, b_sensor_failure
})
“... arrive on the deposit belt”
 -> blank_on_end_deposit_belt.id = id1)))
We have created two SMV models and actually
performed model-checking on a Sun Sparc Ultra-II. The
general model contains 1251 lines of SMV code, while
the simplified model has 1079 lines of the code. The
potential state space of these models is about 1026 – 1034.
The models were instantiated with the number of blanks.
When the general model produces no result for two or
more blanks after one week of computation, the
simplified model responds in all possible situations
within at most 52824.1 seconds.
6: Design for Validation
The analysis of properties of Production Cell II was
carried out in parallel with the development of its CA
action based design. Model-checking helped us to find
several flaws in early versions of the design. By analyzing
the causes for failed proofs of the required properties, we
have been able to derive corresponding solutions. The
flaws we found affected both the fault tolerance and the
coordination aspects of the CA action-design of the cell.
The results from the formal analysis have directly
contributed to refining and improving our design.
To take just one example, we identified a problem
that affected the order in which the robot interacts with the
devices around it. The problem does not occur in the
single blank instance of our model and thus it is hard to
detect by just reviewing the specification text. If two
blanks are in the system then the robot could manoeuvre
itself into a situation from which no further activities
were possible. Such “critical” sequences of actions can be
derived from counter-example paths generated by the
model-checker. The counter-example also helps in finding
solutions to the detected problem: we dealt with this
particular problem by enabling the occurrence of the next
appropriate actions after such critical sequences. This was
done by appropriately weakening the preconditions of the
actions to be executed next
7: Conclusions
Unlike the first Production Cell model, in the “Fault-
Tolerant Production Cell” failures of electro-mechanical
components are of major concern. This requires a control
program that is much more complex than the program
developed for the original cell, though it follows the same
general strategy, i.e. using CA actions where there are
safety-critical interactions. In order to develop the required
control program, we have conducted an analysis of
possible component failures and identified the various
ways of detecting these failures. We have used the results
of this analysis to guide the design of a system
employing what is in fact a very sophisticated exception
handling scheme, capable of dealing appropriately even
with concurrent occurrences of any of the wide variety of
possible failures defined in the FZI.
 We have implemented our control system using a
Java implementation of a distributed CA action support
scheme [12]. (This scheme makes use of the nested multi-
threaded transaction facilities provided by the Arjuna
transaction support system [9].) During the testing phase
and the demonstration of our implementation, all injected
device or sensor failures were caught successfully and
handled immediately by our control program. Even a
previously unknown software bug in the original FZI
simulator was also detected by the acceptance test of a CA
action and recovered by the retry operation associated with
the action. We are now in the stage of collecting
experimental data for further dependability and
performance-related evaluation.
As a result of the experience we have gained during
the process of formalizing and designing this control
software, we feel that we now have a much fuller
understanding of CA actions and the design issues
involved in their implementation. It was very pleasing to
confirm that the much more complex requirements of
Production Cell II could be satisfied by what was in fact a
straightforward though large extension of the approach we
had used in Production Cell I [13]. This again enabled all
the dependability (and especially the safety) related aspects
of the problem to be solved very directly using just the
CA action mechanism, despite the need to add very
extensive exception handling strategies. It was also
pleasing to confirm that the CA action structuring greatly
aided not just the design but also the validation of the
control program, in this case by model-checking.
In light of the fact that the original Production Cell
was the subject of extensive studies using various formal
approaches, we should emphasize that to the best of our
knowledge our work represents the first and so far only
complete formal analysis and validation of a design for the
much more complex and realistic Production Cell II. The
work in [7] describes a system design for Production Cell
II that focuses just on a dynamic and transparent
reconfiguration scheme that preserves safety properties.
Our design is essentially different, and focuses mainly on
cooperation between devices during both normal execution
and the process of exception handling. A Formal Risk
Analysis approach was developed in [5] for analyzing the
run-time behaviour of Production Cell II, and studying
how various sensor and actuator faults could affect both
system reliability and safety. However, their analysis is
not complete, and only uses the elevating rotary table of
the Production Cell as an example. In contrast, our
analysis is much more comprehensive and complete,
including the classification of various failures and the
identification of possible failures related to every device in
the cell.  This analysis leads further to the design of a
complete control system and an actual, workable
implementation.
The design style we have been using was one that we
arrived at through very specific consideration of the
problems raised by the Production Cell examples. We
now realize that a more methodical and general means of
arriving at the design of CA action-based programs is
possible, as well as being highly desirable [3].
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